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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
HILLARD L. VOORHEES, 
Deceased. 
No. 8809 
RESP·ONDENT'S' BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This matter is before the Supreme Court by way of 
an appeal from a so-called interlocutory order, the Court 
having granted the petition of Pearl 0. Voorhees to re-
view an order of the District Court of Sanpete County, 
State of Utah, appointing Tracy-Collins Trust Company 
as successor administrator in the above entitled estate. 
The order involved was made after a hearing by the Court 
and upon the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, which Findings and Conclusions are not assailed 
in connection with this appeal. 
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For convenience, Respondents will use the samE 
designation as Appellant in referring to the various par. 
ties and the record. 
The statement of facts set forth by Appellant in her 
brief on file herein are substantially correct. However, 
Respondents desire to correct what appear to be one or 
two misleading statements contained in the Statement of 
Facts. At Page 4 of Appellant's Brief appears the state-
ment that "at the request of Respondents" Walker Bank 
and Trust Company filed its rejection of appointment as 
successor administrator. It was not at the request of Re-
spondents that Walker Bank and Trust Company refused 
to qualify, but on its own initiative that the rejection was 
filed. The rejection (R. 99) states no reason for refusing 
to qualify. However, the evidence in the case indicates 
(and the lower Court so found), that the reason the 
\V alker Bank and Trust Company elected not to qualify 
was that it did not desire to get involved in litigation 
which appeared would be necessary to marshal the assets 
belonging to the estate. (Tr. 111) The further reference 
on Page-l of Appellant's Brief to the Order issued by the 
trial court directing .A.ppellant to appear and show cause 
wh~T she should not be found in contempt for failing to 
file her accounting of the estate within the time originally 
n'qnired h~T the court is not material to this appeal. It is 
on]~· PYidt'llee of the fact that the ~\ppellant in this case 
had act Pd "·it hout notiee to the Respondents in obtaining 
from 11H' court an <.'xtension of time to file her accounting. 
HPspondents \n'n' not aware at the time of filing their 
mot ion for an Order to Show Cause that the time for sub-
•) 
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mitting the accounting of Appellant as Administratix had 
been extended. Counsel for Appellant had obtained such 
extension without advising Respondents and without 
obtaining a stipulation therefor. The failure to file the 
accounting was not urged at the time of the hearing before 
the court on December 16th; nor was such failure to file 
in any way involved in the Court's determination to ap-
point Tracy - Collins Trust Company as successor 
administrator. 
On Page 5 of her Brief, Appellant states that the 
order appointing the successor administrator was "modi-
fied by the letter of the judge of the Court below dated 
December 24, 1957." The letter was not a modification of 
the order dated December 16, 1957, but was a notice to 
counsel for the respective parties that in entering the 
order which had been submitted by Respondents herein, 
the Court had corrected what was obviously a typographi-
cal error when it changed the word "partiality" to "im-
partiality" (R. 117). The Court's letter to counsel (a 
copy of which appears at Page 165 of the Record) recites 
that "under date December 23, 1957, I signed and filed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
mailed to me by Arthur H. Nielsen with the following 
qualifications : 
"In Paragraph 9 of the Findings, line 3, I change,d 
the word 'partiality' to 'impartiality' to conform with the 
order entered since the same seemed to be a typographical 
error and not consistent with the order." 
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The Court in the same letter indicated that in its oral 
pronouncement from the bench, as well as in the minuteE 
of the proceedings of December 16th, it had referred to 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company as Tracy Loan and Trust 
Company, and therefore that the minutes were being cor-
rected nunc pro tunc to show that Tracy-Collins Trust 
Company was the name of the successor administrator 
being appointed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellant has raised t\YO points to the effect that (1) 
Appellant had the preferential right to designate the 
administrator, notwithstanding her resignation or re-
moval; and ( 2) In any event, the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company should have been appointed the successor 
administrator. 
Respondents submit that before this Court should 
consider the matter on the merits, it should determine the 
issue rnised on the Petition for an Intermediate Appeal 
that an Order appointing an ~ldministrator is not an 
Interlocutory Order and therefore the Petition should be 
dismi~~~ed. A determination by the Court of this problem 
'iVill b(' of gren t assistance to attorneys in determining 
what 1~ a final order for purposl's of appeal. 
In the eYent this Court should deem it appropriate to 
co:n~idt•r the mnttL'f on the nwrits. Respondents claim: 
1. At the time the Court appointed Tracy-Collins 
Trw·d t \m1pnny as succl'ssor administrator of the estate, 
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Appellant did not have a preferential statutory right to 
designate the appointment of an administrator. 
2. Regardless of whether Appellant did or did not 
have a preferential statutory right to designate an admin-
istrator, the Court did not err in refusing to appoint 
Walker Bank and Trust Company under the facts and cir-
cumstances and the evidence in this case. 
These points will be considered in that order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AT THE TIME THE COURT APPOINTED TRACY-
COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUCCESSOR AD-
MINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, APPELLANT DID 
NOT HAVE A PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT 
TO DESIGNATE THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AD-
MINISTRATOR. 
Although the question whether Appellant had a pref-
erential right to designate the appointment of a successor 
administrator is primarily one of law, we wish to point 
out that the Findings of the Court below in respect to the 
facts are not assailed on appeal and are therefore binding 
and conclusive upon this Court. We call attention to this 
matter for the reason that Appellant seems to ignore the 
fact that the following Findings were made by the Court : 
'' 5. From the evidence thus adduced the 
Court finds that the said Pearl 0. Voorhees has 
failed properly to administer said estate and has 
neglected to account for property which appears 
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to belong thereto and has asserted and now assert1 
adverse interests and claims to the estate.'' 
"7. Thereafter on the 6th day of December 
1957, said Walker Bank & Trust Company filec 
herein its Rejection of the appointment as Sue 
cessor Administrator. The Court finds that said 
Rejection was based upon the ground and for thE 
reason that the said Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany, because of the policy which it has and upon 
advice of its counsel, did not desire to take affirma-
tive steps to collect assets that might belong to the 
estate where an adverse claim thereto exists on 
the part of the said Pearl 0. Voorhees; that the 
said Walker Bank and Trust Company desired 
only to serve as a "stake holder" and not to act 
for the best interests of the estate as required 
by law." 
'' 9. The Court finds that the said Tracy-Col-
lins Trust Company is in all respects competent to 
act as Administrator and will act with fairness 
and impartiality; that in order to prevent further 
delay which may result in waste or lost to the 
estate it is necessary immediately to appoint an 
Administrator; and that there is no legal reason 
why the said Tracy-Collins Trust Company should 
not be appointed Succeessor Administrator." 
"10. By reason of her acts and conduct, and 
h~· reason of the Rejecrion filed by the \\~alker 
Bank and Trust Company the request of Pearl 0. 
Voorhees for the appointment of \Y alker Bank and 
Trust Compan~· should not be granted if the said 
Trney-Collins Trust Company will proceed imme-
dintt>l~· to qualify.·· (R. 116, 117) 
rrhl'~l' findillg'S being conclusiYe upon the matter 
i nsof:1 r n s this a ppcal is concerned, the question whether 
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Pearl 0. Voorhees is entitled to nominate or designate a 
succesesor administrator must be resolved by a determi-
nation of whether a person otherwise disqualified from 
acting in the estate by the reason of neglect of the affairs 
of the estate can nevertheless exercise a preferential 
right to appoint a successor under the provisions of Sec-
tion 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953. This section reads as follows: 
''In case of the removal, resignation, or death 
of one of several Executors or Administrators, the 
Court, if it deems it necessary, may appoint a suc-
cessor or may permit the remaining executor or 
executors, administrator or administrators, to 
complete the execution of the trust. In case of the 
death, resignation or removal of all, the Court 
shaU, upon notice, issue Letters to the person hav-
ing the prior right thereto, or to any competent 
person named by the person having such prior 
right ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
Appellant's position as stated on Page 9 of her brief 
is that the revocation of Letters of Administration "could 
not constitute a waiver or a legal deprivation of the pref-
erential right of the Appellant to nominate the successor 
administrator of the estate.'' In doing so, Appellant 
relies upon the italicized portion of the foregoing quo-
tation to the effect that upon removal of an administrator, 
the Court shall issue Letters to the person "having the 
prior right thereto, or to any competent person named hy 
the person having such prior right.'' 
It is Respondents' position that where a person has 
lost the right to act as an Administrator because of con-
duct which is against the interests of the estate, that such 
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person also loses the right to designate a successor 
administrtor. It is Respondents' further contention that 
the reference in the italicized portion of Section 75-6-3, 
quoted above, to "the person having the prior right 
thereto" is to the next person who would, in the order 
named in Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, have the right to 
be appointed Administrator upon the removal of some-
one with a more preferential right. Thus, if a surviving 
husband or wife (who by the last-named section has the 
first right to be appointed administrator) is removed, 
then the person having the prior right to appointment as 
administrator would be the children, and such children 
would have the right to serve or to designate the adminis-
trator to serve, as the case may be. 
Appellant apparently takes the position that because 
Letters of Administration heretofore issued to her were 
revoked by the trial court upon stipulation of counsel, 
~he did not lose any preferential right for the designa-
tion of the appointment of a successor administrator. 
However, Appellant fails to recognize that in the initial 
petition filed by Respondents herein, it was alleged that 
the conduct on the part of Appellant "has constituted a 
nPglcrt and mismanagement of the affairs of the estate, 
and a wa~h' of the property of Decedent, so that Letters 
of ,\dministration to the said Pearl 0. Yoorhees should 
he immediately revoked.'' (R. 30) The Court -was re-
qtH'S1.l'd to issue" Letters of Administration to 'Valker 
nnnk and rl,rnst Compan~T· (R. 29) 
At thP lwaring- of this petition, Appellant through 
hPr <'ounsel requested the Court to permit her to resign. 
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Nothing was said at that time to the effect that Appellant 
claimed a right to nominate a successor administrator. 
Rather, Appellant acknowledged the right of Respond-
ents to designate such successor by agreeing that the 
Walker Bank and Trust Company should be appointed. 
At that time it appeared that the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company would act with impartiality and aggressively 
protect the interests of the estate. It was not until later 
(after counsel for Appellant had consulted with Mr. Mor-
tensen, the Trust Officer of the Bank) that the Bank 
became concerned and determined that it would rather 
act in the capacity of a "stake holder." (Tr. p. 132, 133) 
Even after Appellant requested permission to resign, 
the Court commented: 
"If she is going to stipulate to her attorney 
she will resign, that is one thing. vVhether the 
court will force her to is another thing." (Tr. 31) 
It was at this juncture that her counsel stated that: 
"She is willing to resign, Your Honor, and 
consents that vValker Bank and Trust Company be 
appointed in her stead." (Tr. 32) (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Although Letters of Administration to Appellant 
were revoked upon stipulation of counsel rather than 
upon a hearing and determination by the Court of h<-'r 
failure properly to conduct herself as administrator 
' nevertheless, under the facts found by the Court after the 
hearing on December 16, 1957, she had lost her right not 
only to be appointed an administrator of the estate of her 
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deceased husband, but also to nominate an administratoJ 
to be appointed. Chapter 4 of Title 75 dealing with th« 
issuance of Letters of Administration not only provide~ 
to whom Letters of Administration may issue ( Sectior 
75-4-1), but also provides who is incompetent to act aE 
an administrator. Section 75-4-4 provides as follows: 
''No person is competent or entitled to serve 
as administrator or administratrix who is either: 
"(1) Under the age of majority or an incom-
petent person; but in such cases letters must be 
granted to his or her guardian, or, in the discre-
tion of the court, to any person entitled to 
administration; 
'' (2) Not a bona fide resident of the state; but 
if the person entitled to serve is not a resident of 
the state, he may request the court or judge to 
appoint a resident of the state to serve as adminis-
trator, and such person may be appointed; 
'' ( 3) Convicted of an infamous crime; 
'' ( 4) Adjudged by the Court incompetent to 
e.rccute tll e duties of tlze trust by reason of drunk-
enness, improvidence. or zra nt of understanding 
or integrity; or, 
' ' ( 5) The survidng partner of a firm of 
which the decedent was a member.'' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The trial court hy its Findings numbered 5 and 10 
(lH'l't>inabo,·p quoted) has determined that ~lppellant is 
iucom} ll't l'Ilt to cxecnh' the duties of trust by reason of her 
lack of inh'grity in administering properly the affairs of 
tltt' <>~tatl' so that ~he hn~ no right to be appointed admin-
i:-1t rntrix of tht' e~tnte under ~uch conditions. Nor does 
10 
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the above section give her the right to nominate a substi-
tute administrator as it does in the case of persons who 
are under the age of majority, incompetent persons, or 
non-residents of the state. Because no provision is made 
for the recognition of any right of a person adjudged by 
the court to be incompetent under the provisions of subdi-
vision (4), then under the maxim of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius it must be concluded that the legislative 
intent was· to preclude such persons from having the right 
to make a substitute designation. See 50 Am. Jur., 
STATUTEs, Sec. 244. 
While Section 75-4-4 provides for the exclusion of 
persons from appointment to the office of an administra-
tor where such person is incompetent by reason of certain 
alleged acts, Setcion 75-6-1 provides for the removal of 
such an individual as an administrator where it appears 
that subsequent to his appointment, he has been guilty of 
''neglect, mismanagement, waste, embezzlement, incom-
petency,'' etc. 
In the present instance there was no reason initially 
to suspect that Appellant would not act in the capacity of 
Administratrix with fidelity and to the best interests of 
the estate. Subsequent to her appointment, it became 
apparent by reason of the failure to account to the Court 
for considerable items of property, which it appeared 
had belonged to the decedent during his lifetime, that ~he 
was not acting for the best interests of the estate, nor was 
she acting with integrity in connection with the adminis-
tration thereof. It therefore became necessary for Re-
11 
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spondents to file a petition to have her removed and, but 
for her voluntary resignation, the Court obviously 
would have had cause to remove her under the evidence 
in the case. Upon her removal - whether for cause or 
by stipulation of counsel- she became and was incom-
petent to designate or nominate a succeessor administra-
tor under the provisions of Section 75-4-4, and 75-6-1 
above referred to. 
We submit that upon the removal of an administra-
tor, it is not possible for the Court immediately to re-
appoint such person upon the alleged theory that such 
person has a ''prior right'' to be appointed administra-
tor under the provisions of Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953. 
Since such person has lost the right to be appointed per-
sonally, the person has likewise lost the right to nomi-
nate a successor by reason of the provisions of Section 
75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that the Court shall, 
upon notice, issue letters to the person having the prior 
right thereto, or to any competent person named by the 
person having such prior right. If the person has no prior 
right to be appointed personally, then such person has no 
prior right to name a successor. It is only in the case 
where the person has a ri~ht to be appointed himself that 
he can successfully claim the right to designate someone 
else in his stead. 
The cases cited b~· Appellant in respect to the exer-
cise of the right to designate an administrator are all 
cases in which the person designating the administrator 
had not lost or forfeited any preferential right to be 
appointed personally as administrator. 
1:2 
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In the case of In Re Pingree's Estate (1929) 74 Utah 
384, 279 Pac. 901, the trial court denied the widow her 
preferential right to be appointed administratrix which 
was reversed by this Court, stating that because the trial 
court had found the widow to be a ''competent person to 
be charged with the administration of the affairs of the 
estate" it could not deny her right to appointment "in 
the absence of showing some good and sufficient reason to 
the contrary." In the instant matter the trial court has 
not only found that Appellant is not a competent person 
to be charged with the administration of the affairs of 
the estate, but it has also found good and sufficient reason 
why neither she nor the Walker Bank and Trust Company 
(subsequently designated by her) should be appointed. 
Again in the case of InRe Johnson Estate, (1934) 84 
Utah 168, 35 P. 2d 305, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
right of a widow to be appointed administratrix of the 
estate of her deceased husband ''as a matter of right, in 
the absence of showing some good and sufficient reason 
to the contrary.'' 
The case of In Re Martin Estates (1946) 109 Utah 
131, 166 P. 2d 197, is not in point because it involves a 
situation where a married daughter nominated an admin-
istrator of the estate when by statute she was not per-
mitted to act because of her marital status. There the 
Court said: 
"Even though the statute declares them to be 
incompetent to administer an estate, infants and 
incompetents, through guardians, and non-resi-
dent heirs may exercise the right of nomination 
under the statute.'' 
13 
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The Court went on to place a married woman in the 
same category as infants and incompetents and author-
ized her to nominate an administrator, although she her-
self could not serve because of her marital status. Ob-
viously, this case does not have any bearing upon the 
issues before the Court now for the reason that we are 
not concerned with the marital status which disqualifies 
the party from acting, but neglect, and other conduct on 
the part of Appellant which made her incompetent to 
serve as Administratrix. 
Though our Supreme Court has never passed on the 
precise issue presented by this appeal, it has nevertheless 
been called upon to consider the sufficiency of evidence 
to justify the trial court in removing an administrator 
of an estate under the provisions of Section 75-6-1, here-
inbefore quoted. In the case of In Re Robison's Estate, 
59 Utah 431, 204 Pac. 321, the sur\iving widow had ini-
tially petitioned for the appointment of a nephew as 
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. Fol-
lowing the filing of the Inventory and ~\ppraisement by 
the administrator certain heirs petitioned the court for 
rp,·ocation of Letters of Administration because the ad-
millistrator had "wrongfully and unlawfully left out of 
the said inYentor~· and appraisement certain property be-
longing to the estate.'' The petition further alleged that 
tho administrator had permitted the widow to have pos-
S(~ssioll of certain property which in truth and in fact 
l><'long-rd to the estate. At the close of the testimony 
oiT<'r<'<l i11 support of the petition seeking removal of the 
administrntor, the trial court granted a motion for non-
14 
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suit from which the heirs appealed. In reversing the lower 
court and remanding the matter for further evidence and 
determination, the Supreme Court held that the evidence 
submitted was such as to require the trial court to deter-
mine the sufficiency thereof on the merits. The Court 
went on to point out that it was the duty of the adminis-
trator to make and return to the Court a true Inventory 
and Appraisement of all of the estate which has come to 
his possession or knowledge. The fact that the adminis-
trator had permitted the widow to obtain possession of 
certain property without taking any action in respect 
thereto was sufficient evidence to require the lower court 
to ''hear any testimony offered on the part of Respondent, 
if any was offered, or, if none were offered, to make Find-
ings of Fact upon the testimony before it.'' The Supreme 
Court stated that the ruling of the lower court on the 
motion for non-suit had to be considered in connection 
with the legal effect of such a motion, and in that light 
the court was clearly wrong in granting the motion for 
non-suit. 
Except for the amount of property which has not 
been reported, the facts in the instant matter might to 
some extent be said to be analogous to the facts in the 
Robison Case. Here, Appellant originally filed an Inven-
tory and Appraisement which listed property and assets 
of the approximate value of $10,000.00. Within a few 
days after the filing of the petition by Respondents to 
have Appellant removed as administratrix, a supple-
mental inventory was filed in which Appellant acknowl-
edged that the decedent owned an undivided one-half in-
15 
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terest in a partnership between himself and his brother 
Henry Voorhees, and further that such partnershii 
owned certain equipment which the inventory listed, an( 
which was appraised at approximately $2,400.00. Wha1 
the supplemental inventory failed to do, however, was tc 
report that shortly before the death of the decedent, Mrs. 
Voorhees received from the partner, the sum of $5,186.25 
which she deposited in her own name in the bank under 
"sheep account." (Tr. 8) The amount of this deposit is 
shown on Exhibit 1 in evidence. (R. 55) In her testimony, 
Mrs. Voorhees admitted that her husband was, during his 
lifetime, engaged in a partnership operation with his 
brother, Henry. (Tr. 7) Subsequent to the initial deposit 
of $5186.25 which l\Irs. Voorhees had received from the 
other partner (and in connection with which there was 
no testimony that this money had ever been given to her 
by her husband), she received an additional sum of 
$2,441.34 on or about July 16, 1956 (eight days before her 
husband's death). This amount represented one-half of 
the incentive payment made to the partnership by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation on account of wool sold 
during the preceding year and would therefore obnously 
belong to her husband and not to ~Irs. Yoorhees (Tr. 17). 
See also Exhibit ~. (R. 56) ~\_ppellant also retained cash 
in the amount of $10,100.00 which was in the home at the 
time her husband died, together with other amounts paid 
to lwr husband on indebtednesses owing to him. (Exhibit 
12, R. 84) Exhibit 3 reYl'als that during the time the 
sheep account remained artiYe in the l\Ianti City Bank 
(whirh account wns opened up by ..Appellant in the name 
of Penrl 0. Voorhees, or BeYerly D. Clyde, or Betty V. 
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Hayward), in excess of $35,000.00 was deposited, all of 
which, according to the testimony, came from money or 
property or other assets which had belonged to decedent 
during his lifetime. 
In addition thereto, Appellant claims title as against 
the estate to a considerable amount of real property as 
well as to the personal property consisting of the interest 
in the sheep belonging to the partnership, and all other 
interests of the decedent in the partnership other than 
to the personal equipment listed in the supplemental 
inventory. 
It is further significant to point out that even after 
the hearing on the petition to have Mrs. Voorhees re-
moved as administratrix, and on or about the lOth of 
January, 1958, Mrs. Voorhees filed a further supple-
mental inventory and appraisement in which certain 
additional property was listed as belonging to the estate. 
(R.157) Part of the property listed therein was property 
which Petitioners in their original petition alleged was 
not accounted for by Appellant and had been wrongfully 
retained by her. 
This evidence, in the light of the decision of this 
Court in the Robison Case, supra, to the effect that "Dis-
trict Courts are, and as a matter of necessity must be, 
given a wide discretion in the conduct of estates, and 
should not be limited or restricted unnecessarily" cer-
tainly justified the decision of the trial court in appoint-
ing the Tracy-Collins Trust Company as the successor 
administrator to Appellant herein. 
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In a later case, In Re Bogert's Estate, 76 Utah 56€ 
290 Pac. 947, this Court, again reiterating that the lowe: 
court has large discretion in determining whether an exec 
utrix should be removed, affirmed a decision of the loweJ 
court removing the executrix who claimed money appar 
ently belonging to the estate. In so doing, the Cour1 
stated: 
''As has been seen, our statute gives the cour1 
power to revoke the letters of any executor 01 
administrator for neglect, mismanagement, waste1 
incompetency, incapacity, or for any other reasou 
deemed sufficient by the court. The Court appoint-
ing an administrator or executor has a very large 
discretion in determining whether, upon the facts 
presented, the officer shall either be removed or 
suspended, and unless it appears that such dis-
cretion has been abused, the action of the trial 
court will not be disturbed on appeal. Farnsworth 
v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151 P. 537; In re Newell's 
Estate, 18 Cal. App. 258, 122 P. 1099." 
The Court cited the earlier case of Fan1s1cortlz v. 
Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151 Pac. 537, where the Court dis-
cusses the authorities on the subject as follows: 
"Upon the other hand, counsel for the appel-
lants refer us to cases in which the courts have 
removed administrators or executors upon the 
ground that their interests conflicted with those of 
1lw (•states the~- n--presented. Among the cases 
cih'd upon that subject are the following: In re 
Gleason's Estate, 17 :l\Iisc. Rep. 510, 41 N.Y. Supp. 
418; 1\lnrks Y. Conts, 31 Or. 609, 6~ Pac. 488: Put-
11<'~- , •• Fletcher, 1-1-8 1\[nss. ~47, 19 N.E. 370; I\Iills 
Y. 1\Tills, ~~ Or. ~10, ~n Pac. 443; I\::ellberg's Ap-
}H'a 1. 86 Pa. 1~~)-133; In re \Vallace, 68 App. DiY. 
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649, 74 N.Y. Supp. 33. In Marks v. Coates, supra, 
the Court, in passing upon the question, says : 
'' 'One whose personal interests are in conflict 
with his duty as administrator is not a proper per-
son to hold the office.' 
"In Putney v. Fletcher, supra, the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts, in the course of the opin-
ion, said: 
'' 'An executor or administrator is deemed 
unsuitable when he has any conflicting personal 
interest which prevents him from doing his offi-
cial duty.' 
''To the same effect are the other cases last 
above cited. In the very nature of things such 
must be the law. The old proverb, 'No man can 
serve two masters,' or;as the Spanish put it, 'He 
who has two masters to serve must lie to one of 
them,' is as true now as it ever was, and is as ap-
plicable in the administration of estates as else-
where. Indeed, in such matters courts should be 
very careful to prevent the claimants or creditors 
from passing upon their own claims, where such 
claims are being contested. ln. the nature of things 
it is not possible for any one to act with perfect 
impartiality and fairness in a matter in which he 
claims valuable and important interests. That fact 
is universally recognized, and especially in our 
courts of justice, and the only reason that it is not 
always strictly applied is because it is impractical 
to do so.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
In the Farnsworth Case, the action of the lower court 
in refusing to revoke Letters of Administration was re-
versed, the Supreme Court stating that under all the 
facts and circumstances the "lower court should at least 
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have requested Respondent to surrender the office of 
executrix, and upon her refusal to do so, should promptly 
have removed her from office.'' The Court further stated 
that under all the facts and circumstances it appeared 
"that it would be quite proper for the court to appoint 
some suitable and proper person, and one who is satis-
factory to the parties in interest, if possible to do, to act 
in place of the Respondent.'' 
If, as is reflected in the decisions of the Robison, 
Farnsworth and Bogert Cases, supra, the conduct of 
Appellant in this case was such as not only to justify, but 
require the Court to request her to resign or to remove 
her for cause, then it is Respondents' contention that 
Appellant has lost any right to designate her successor. 
Certainly, the right of a nominee to be appointed 
Administrator of an estate is no greater than the right 
of the nominor to be personally appointed administrator. 
Such is the ruling of the California Court In re Homer-
rille's Estate, 12 Cal. App. 2d 430, 55 P. 2d 597, where the 
Court said: 
"A relative is entitled to priority in appoint-
ment oni~~ when entitled to succeed to the estate or 
some portion thereof (Probate Code, Sec. 422); 
and a nominee as such can haYe no greater right 
than the person entitled. (In re Estate of ~Iyers, 
9 Cnl. App. 694, 100 P. 712; In re Estate of Con-
nick. 189 Cnl. 498, 209 P. 346.) '' 
In the Cnse of Iu rc Connick's Estate. 189 Cal. 498, 
209 Pac. 356, the Supreme Court of California held: 
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''The effect of these decisions is not only to 
destroy that portion of appellant's contention that 
the nominee of a person other than the surviving 
husband or wife entitled to administer gains there-
by an absolute and irrevocable right to seek such 
administration which cannot be affected by the 
subsequent change in the status of the nominor; 
but it would also seem to follow logically there-
from that the right of such nominee to receive the 
appointment as administrator must be determined 
by the state of facts existing at the time such ap-
pointment is to be made, and if at such time the 
nominor has either rightfully withdrawn his nomi-
natipn or has become himself for any reason in-
competent or no longer entitled to be appointed 
such administrator, the right of his nominee to 
receive such appointment must also be held to have 
ceased.'' 
In that case the nominee had been nominated by a 
person who had the prior right of appointment but the 
nominor had thereafter died. The nominee claimed her 
appointment as administratrix should nevertheless be en-
forced. But the Court held that since the nominor 's right 
to be appointed himself had lapsed, so likewise had his 
right to designate a successor. 
In the case of D. E. Prum's Estate v. Boards, 26 Cal. 
App. 2d 319, 79 P. 2d 414, the Court held in determining 
the right of a nominee to be appointed Administratrix 
of the estate, that such nominee, insofar as any adverse 
interest to the estate is concerned, must be treated as 
standing in the same position as the nominor. Thus in 
the instant case, if the Walker Bank and Trust Company 
is to be considered to be the nominee of the Appellant, it 
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must be considered to have the same adverse interests to 
the estate, which its nominor Appellant has, and there-
fore disqualified to act. 
A very recent case which presents a very similar 
situation to the one here involved is that of In the Matter 
of the Estate of Eli B. Adkins (Montana 1957), 319 P. 
2d 512, where the Montana Supreme Court (in interpret-
ing a statute very similar to ours granting the surviving 
wife, or ''some competent person whom she may request 
to have appointed'' the prior right to administer the 
estate of the deceased husband), after reviewing the au-
thorities, including the Farnsworth Case, supra, concludes 
as follows: 
''These cases announce the rule applicable 
here, and condemn the appointment of the widow, 
or one whom she might nominate.'' 
A good statement on the matter is contained in Vol-
ume 2 of Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Sec-
tion 251, Page 67,. as follows: 
''While, in limine, the surviving spouse has an 
absolute right to nominate, once she accepts letters 
in her own name the right to nominate another is 
waived. In case of remoz-a.l for misconduct or be-
cause of an assertion of rights adrerse to the es-
state, the surviving spouse of the decedent, who 
has been acting as representa.tive, by having 
accepted letters in 71 cr own na1ne has waived her 
right to nominate atnother; and, furthermore, she 
should not be permitted to nominate a. successor by 
reason of the probable bias of her nominee in favor 
of her adt·crse clahn." (Emphasis supplied) 
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POINT II. 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER APPELLANT DID OR 
DID NOT HAVE A PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT 
TO DESIGNATE AN ADMINISTRATOR, THE COURT 
DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO APPOINT WALKER 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY UNDER THE FACTS 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE IN 
THIS CASE. 
Appellant maintains that even if the Court should de-
termine that she in some manner waived or conducted 
herself as administratrix so as to lose her preferential 
right to nominate a successor, nevertheless, the Walker 
Bank and Trust Company by its attempted withdrawal 
of its rejection of appointment (R. 114) should have been 
permitted to qualify as the administrator. However, the 
authority cited by Appellant in support of this propo-
sition does not in fact do so. Section 47 (d) of Volume 33, 
C.J.S. on Executors and Administrators states that "the 
question of permitting a retraction is committed to the 
sound discreiton of the Court. Generally speaking,. how-
ever, retraction should not be permitted while proceedings 
for appointment of another are pending." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Here we have a situation where, at the time of the 
attempted retraction, proceedings were pending for the 
appointment of another administrator. The attempted 
retraction does not state any reasons for desiring to 
retract except that the bank has "had an opportunity to 
more fully consider its actions with reference'' thereto. 
i\Ir. Mortensen in his testimony on that matter stated 
as follows: 
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"Mr. Nielsen correctly stated to the court, 
his statement awhile ago, the circumstances as 
they came about between Mr. Nielsen and the Bank 
and between a daughter of the decedent and the 
Bank. When I, after I had talked to Mrs. Hayward 
I felt that I couldn't make commitments that would 
be satisfactory to her and rather than to have any 
dissatisfaction on the part of some of the heirs 
that I just preferred to step aside for someone 
else. But I la.ter found that Mrs. Voorhees thought 
that we ought to accept and if she had any prior 
right of appointment that she had some say about 
it also. So I decided that stepping aside wasn't 
going to solve all the problems of this estate any-
way. They seemed to increase rather than de-
crease. So I decided that maybe we could render 
the estate a service by qualifying, withdrawing the 
previous objection. And for that reason I ha\e 
decided that if the. court sees :fit to appoint us to 
take the estate we will do the best job that we can." 
(Tr. 129) (Emphasis supplied) 
It is therefore readily apparent that the Bank sought 
only to take advantage of what it understood (apparently 
from Appellant's counsel) was the preferential right of 
appellant to nominate the administrator. E\en under 
such circumstances, the retraction of its previous rejec-
tion was conditioned upon the court seeing :fit to appoint 
the bank to take the place of :\Irs. Y oorhees. The Court 
did not see fit to appoint the bank, because as the court 
found, the bank had a policy against inYolYing itself in 
litigation which might be necessary for the best interests 
of the estate. 
Under the proYisions of Section 75-7-1, U.C.A., 1953, 
an administrator ''must make and return to the court ... 
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a true inventory and appraisement of all of the estate of 
the decedent which has come to his possession or knowl-
edge." Likewise, Section 75-11-3 provides that the ad-
ministrator "is entitled to, and must take possession of, 
all the real and personal estate of the decedent, and shall 
receive the rents and profits of the real estate until the 
state is settled or delivered over by order of the Court.'' 
Under this latter quoted section, the Court has held 
that it is ordinarily the duty of every administrator to 
ascertain and defend the property and rights of the estate 
as against any adverse claimant. In re Picot's Estate, 53 
Utah 195, 178 Pac. 75. The Picot Case illustrates very 
pointedly the problem which results from an administra-
trix asserting adverse claims to the estate. There the 
wife of the decedent on being appointed administratrix 
filed an inventory, the appraisement of which amounted 
to approximately $25,000.00. Based upon this inventory 
the Court fixed the amount owing the State of Utah for 
inheritance taxes. Later the State Treasurer set up that 
the decedent owned at the time of his death, certain notes 
and mortgags which he had purported to assign, but which 
assignment was not effective. That as a result thereof, the 
estate should have included such notes and mortgages of 
the reasonable value of approximately $280,000. The 
trial court upon hearing the matter determined that the 
administratrix, to whom the assignment of the notes and 
mortgages had purportedly been made within a day or 
two prior to the death of decedent, had failed to report 
said property as a part of the assets of the estate when 
in truth and in fact it belonged there, because said assign-
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ment had not been completed at the time of the death of 
the decedent. From an order of the court including 
these assets in the estate, the administatrix appealed. 
The Supreme Court in noting such appeal stated: 
"We remark that the appeal in this case pre-
sents a somewhat anomalous situation. Here the 
administratrix of the estate appeals from a judg-
ment which is most favorable to the estate, in that 
by the judgment the assets of the estate are in-
creased to the extent of more than $280,000.'' 
The Court went on to state : 
"Ordinarily, it is the duty of every adminis-
trator to ascertain and to defend the property and 
rights of the estate as against any adverse 
claimant. 
''If, therefore, the legality of the assignments 
of the notes and mortgages were merely doubtful, 
the administratrix should at least have obtained 
the judgment of the court respecting their legality, 
and should not haYe determined that question for 
herself. If, therefore, the administratrix repre-
sents the estate on this appeal she manifestly is 
not serving the best interests of the estate, but is 
defending her own interests as against the estate.'' 
In the light of the testimony of l\Ir. :\Iortensen, the 
trial court found ''that the "\Y alker Bank and Trust Com-
pany desired only to serve as a 'stake holder' and not to 
act for the best interests of the estate as required by 
law.'' This finding surely should be sufficient to justify 
the trial court in refusing to allow "\V alker Bank and 
Trust Company to withdraw its rejection of appoint-
ment, and in any event should justify the trial court in 
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refusing to appoint the Walker Bank and Trust Company 
under any circumstances, regardless of the right of Appel-
lant to designate a successor. 
This court has always taken the position, even where 
it has affirmed a right of a person to designate a nominee, 
that such right is always subject to the condition that the 
right must be recognized ''in the absence of showing of 
some good and sufficient reason to the contrary.'' See 
In re Johnson's Estate, 84 Utah 168, 35 Pac. 2d 305; In re 
Pingree's Estate, supra. We submit the evidence in the 
case, and the Findings of the Court, establish that ''good 
and sufficient" reason why Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany should not be appointed administrator of the Estate. 
Finally, we again call the court's attention to its de-
cision in In re Robison's Estate, supra, to the effect that 
the probate courts are and, ''as a matter of necessity must 
be given a wide discretion in the conduct of estates." 
A good statement of the responsibility of the ap-
pellate court in reviewing an order of the probate court 
in a matter such as this is contained in Bancroft's Pro-
bate Practice, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 314, Page 234, as 
follows: 
"On appeal, moreover, every intendment is in 
favor of the order of the probate court. Removal 
of an administrator on a petition chargin~ neglect, 
incompetency, mingling of property, etr., and the 
appointment of a successor for such administrator, 
should not be disturbed on appeal where the evi-
dence is conflicting and discretion does not appear 
to have been abused." (Emphasis supplied) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-
mitted that the order of the trial court appointing Tracy-
Collins Trust Company as successor administrator to 
Pearl 0. Voorhees should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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